Articles
Approximate Objects are Precise in Some Contexts
Concepts that are ill-defined in general can be precise in limited contexts. We propose applications for this idea in AI and in philosophy.Concepts that are ill-defined in general can be precise in limited contexts. We propose applications for this idea in AI and in philosophy.
Two previous papers (McCarthy 1993) (extended by (McCarthy and Buvac 1997)) and (McCarthy 2000) respectively discussed the idea of context as a formal object and the idea of an approximate entity without an if-and-only-if definition. The present paper combines these ideas. An entity without an if-and-only-if definition in general may admit such a definition in a suitably specialized context.
One example is the concept of a person owning an object, e.g. a house or a loaf of bread. In general owning is complicated, and many of these complications appear in case of a house. On the other hand, buying and hence owning a loaf of bread is ordinarily quite simple. The relation between owning in simple specialized contexts and owning in more general contexts is formalized in this paper.
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